The swift rise in quantum computing casts a shadow on the efficacy of traditional IAM sheds. This research paper intends to define the ‘readiness ‘state of the IAM framework in relation to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) and the methodological approach needed to protect the transition. This focuses on the authentication, encryption and digital signing in the RSA, ECC, and Diffie-Hellman whos ease of access has been compromised to quantum computing. The case studies assess complexities such as RSA, ECC, and the Diffie-Hellman algorithm for authentication and encryption, alongside NIST policies, to configure the architecture. This also studies the policies on paramount underlying NIST HIPAA and GDPR that argue for slow, stepped migration to IM in the IAM framework. The research still retains quantum attacks as the foremost assaults to enterprise blockchain. As the case studies suggest, immense risks are associated with the rapidly emerging fundamental notions of interactivity, practicality, and IAM cryptography. Thus, the NIST PQC strategy possession and digital signing restraints suggest implementing a pluralistic encryption model and advocating compliance with the quartet that lowers the threshold to cryptography protected by PQC. The NIST HIPAA policies assert certain presumptions, as formulated, are presumed rational with more than sufficient backbone, and remain warm, unfrozen. The outcome is confident in saying that IAM frameworks require foresight while algorithmically synthesising responses to counter aggressor base… quantum-related forces.